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 Russia’s recent increase in acts of aggression against bordering nations is 
concerning. After Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, many wondered 
if the world should anticipate a Baltic intervention. This paper seeks to analyze this 
question through a comparative study of Russia’s recent interventions in Georgia and 
Ukraine, an analysis of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking population, and an 
analysis of the NATO alliance’s strengths and weaknesses in deterring a possible Russian 
threat. From my analysis, I conclude that a conventional Baltic intervention is unlikely. 
However, I also conclude that the NATO alliance is not prepared to counter non-
conventional acts of aggression and that these tactics could become more common in 
international conflicts. Therefore, I also conclude that a non-conventional Baltic 
intervention from Russia is possible and, consequently, the alliance should re-examine its 
framework.   
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CHAPTER I 
 A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIAN INTERVENTIONS 
 
 Russia’s recent acts of aggression in bordering states warrant some concern, 
particularly regarding the Baltic states. Though the likelihood of Russia engaging in 
conventional warfare with Estonia or Latvia is slim because of NATO membership, 
perhaps it should not be overlooked. The aim of this study is to analyze Russia’s recent 
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine to determine key similarities and differences that 
might indicate a future action in the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia.  
In this chapter, I start with a brief description of the events in Georgia and Ukraine, 
followed by a discussion of the similarities that I view are most relevant in determining a 
Russian intervention in the future: bordering geography, Russia’s use of international texts 
for justification, and the presence of a “window of opportunity” with an allegedly 
discriminated compatriot population. I also discuss a significant difference between the 
two conflicts, which is Russia’s evolving capability of engaging in new generation warfare 
tactics. In the next chapter, I use statistics from Estonia and Latvia to assess whether Russia 
could build a similar argument to intervene in the name of humanitarian goals. Statistics 
show that Russian-speaking communities in both countries experience higher 
unemployment and at-risk poverty rates. Furthermore, Russia’s allegations that these 
governments are ignoring or exacerbating this problem of inequality seems valid. Next, I 
discuss aspects of the NATO alliance that may not be prepared to confront a conventional 
or non-conventional Russian threat in the Baltics. I conclude with some final remarks and 
observations.   
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Russia’s Shocks the World with Georgian Intervention 
           After Georgia’s independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
government in Tbilisi faced political challenges from two regions, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, regarding political status. South Ossetia felt Tbilisi’s economic policies 
disadvantaged South Ossetians and Abkhazia wanted to its autonomy reinstated, which the 
Soviets abolished in 1931.1 Conflict with the government eventually spurred the outbreak 
of two civil wars; one with South Ossetia from 1991-1992 and the other with Abkhazia 
from 1992-1993.2 Russia, worried about instability spilling over into its territory, helped 
broker a cease-fire agreement for each conflict with the Sochi Agreement.3 The agreement 
permitted around 1,100 Russian peacekeepers to be stationed in both regions to ensure 
continued peace.4  
Tensions between these two regions and Tbilisi remained high, with South Ossetia 
even declaring its “independence” from Georgia after a referendum in 2006.5 During the 
summer of 2008, violence sparked again between South Ossetia and the Georgian 
government after a bomb killed a South Ossetian police chief.6 On August 7th, Georgian 
president Mikheil Saakashvili declared a unilateral ceasefire on the Georgian side, urging 
                                                
1 Souleimanov, Emil. Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict : Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia 
Wars Reconsidered. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. Rethinking 
Peace and Conflict Studies. 130-131. 
 
2 Ibid.; 147-148. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4Nichol, Jim. “Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests”. 
Congressional Research Service. March 3, 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf. 3. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid.: 4. 
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the South Ossetian militias to do the same.7 According to Saakashvili, the Ossetian militias 
continued shelling Georgian villages, forcing him to order an attack on Tskhinvali with the 
goal of restoring order to the area.8 However, several Russian peacekeepers died as a result 
of Georgia’s attack.9 
In response, Russia entered Georgia on August 8th, fighting alongside South 
Ossetian militias.10 Shortly thereafter, violence also erupted in Abkhazia.11 August 10 
statements from U.N. officials reported aerial bombings targeting Georgian troops in the 
Kodri Valley and increased movement of Abkhazian militia forces.12 Fighting continued 
to escalate as Russian and Abkhazian forces advanced towards the Abkahzian and 
Georgian border, causing Georgians in the Kodri Valley to flee.13  
Only five days after the beginning of the conflict, France helped broker a peace 
plan. In the agreement Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were labeled as “parties to the 
conflict,” while France, on behalf of the EU, and Russia were labeled “mediators”.14 The 
agreement called for a ceasefire of hostilities, access to humanitarian aide, a withdrawal of 
Russian combat troops, and a retreat of Russian “peacekeepers” to pre-conflict numbers 
                                                
 
7 Ibid.: 5. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid.: 3-6. 
 
10 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts”. CNN News. March 26, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/.  
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Ibid.: 6. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Ibid.: 7-8. 
  
4 
within the areas designated in the Sochi Agreement.15 Any specific mention of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity, however, was not included.16 On August 26, Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev signed decrees officially recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which he stated was in response to the will of the people and right to self-
determination.17 However under international law, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are still 
considered regions of Georgia.18 South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue to endure a frozen 
conflict.           
  
…and Again in Ukraine 
Russia shocked the world again when entering Ukraine after months of political 
protests. In 2012, the EU started negotiating the Eastern Partnership Agreement with 
former Soviet states with the goal of promoting economic stability through EU sponsored 
reforms and enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.19 Economist hoped lowering trade barriers would 
stimulate Ukraine’s economy, which was suffering more in comparison to other central 
and eastern European countries after its transition to a market economy.20 When Ukrainian 
                                                
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation.” President of Russia. August 26, 2008. Web. 
 
18 “Statement by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 
August 26, 2008. Web. 
 
19 “The Third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius”. Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union 2013. December 2, 2013. http://www.eu2013.lt/en/vilnius-summit. 
20 Ibid.:  
  
5 
president Victor Yanukovych took office in 2010, man thought the Russian-leaning 
president still planned to sign the trade agreement.  
Expectations changed, however, in November 2013. A few weeks before Ukraine 
was expected to sign the agreement at the Vilnius Summit, Yanukovych released a decree 
officially suspending Ukraine’s negotiations on the Partnership Agreement.21 According 
to the Ukrainian government, the suspension of the EU Partnership Agreement was in 
consideration of the country’s “national interests,” whose partnership with the West could 
bring severe repercussions from its biggest trading partner, Russia.22 Instead of the EU 
trade agreement, Yanukovych signed a deal with Putin, in which Russia committed to buy 
15 billion dollars of Ukrainian bonds and lowered the price of gas for Ukraine by 30% until 
2019.23 Although this agreement gave Ukraine quick and direct access to investment for 
development, it also kept Ukraine under the Kremlin’s “sphere of influence” and the West 
out. 
After the gas deal with Russia, protests in Kyiv escalated, leading to the dissolution 
of Yanukovych’s government and the president’s loss of power. In a final attempt to bring 
back stability and security to Ukraine, President Yanukovych signed a peace agreement 
that decreased the presidential powers, guaranteed constitutional reform by September 
                                                
 
21 Traynor, Ian, and Grytsenko, Oksana. “Ukraine Suspends Talks on EU Trade Pact as Putin Wins Tug of 
War”. The Guardian. November 21, 2013. Web. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-
suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact.   
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Walker, Shaun. “Vladimir Putin Offers Ukraine Financial Incentives to Stick with Russia”. The 
Guardian. December 18, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/ukraine-russia-leaders-
talks-kremlin-loan-deal.  
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2014, and promised new presidential elections by December 2014.24 Immediately 
following the agreement, Yanukovych fled to Eastern Ukraine and then to Russia, claiming 
that he was escaping a political “coup” against him.25 Shortly after Yanukovych fled the 
country, Russian troops entered Crimea to secure its military facilities, such as the Black 
Sea Fleet, and, allegedly, to protect the lives of Russian citizens in Crimea and give the 
peninsula the right to self-determination.26 However, scholars like Daniel Treisman has 
noted that Putin had historically shown little interest in Crimean self-determination and 
views the nationalist threat to Crimea as “invented.”27 Unidentified soldiers, known as 
“little green men” stormed the Crimean parliament building, raising the Russian flag over 
the building.28 When asked about the identity of these soldiers, Putin claimed they were 
Crimean “self-defense forces” who had independently acquired military gear and denied 
any allegations suggesting these individuals were connected with Russia.29 After the 
storming of the Crimean parliament, the local government held a referendum, which 
                                                
24 Traynor, Ian. “Ukraine Opposition Leader Sign Deal with Government”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-president-says-deal-has-been-reached-
opposition-bloodshed.  
 
25 Edward, Anna. “Moment Suspected Ukrainian Sniper was Dragged by the Hair and Beaten by Anti-
Government Protesters as President Reportedly Flees Capital”. Daily Mail. February 22, 2014. Web. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565394/Ukrainian-protesters-claim-control-capital.html; 
Englund, Will. "Ukraine’s ousted president surfaces in Russia, says he is still head of state". The 
Washington Post. February 27, 2014. Web. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gunmens-seizure-of-
parliament-building-stokes-tensions-in-ukraines-crimea/2014/02/27/2539871c-9f83-11e3-9ba6-
800d1192d08b_story.html?utm_term=.6c2a613b95aa. 
 
26 Treisman, Daniel. “Why Putin Took Crimea”. Foreign Policy Online. May/June 2016. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea. 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Shevchenko, Vitaly. “‘Little Green Men’ of ‘Russian Invaders?’”. BBC News. March 11, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.  
 
29 Ibid.:  
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reported 95% of voters supported seceding from Ukraine to join Russia.30 Europe declared 
the statement illegal and did not recognize the results.31 
The conflict in Ukraine continued to escalate in April, when protestors against the 
new government in Kyiv occupied government buildings in eastern Ukraine and declared 
the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LPR) and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR).32 
As in Crimea, these cities also held referendums where a majority of voters were in favor 
of seceding from Ukraine.33 However, unlike Crimea, these referendums asked about 
autonomy and special status instead of joining Russia.34 Ukraine, the United States, the 
European Union, and Russia did not recognize the referendums.35  
Since the referendum, fighting has continued in the region, with separatist forces 
fighting against the Ukrainian army. Though there were two peace agreement attempts, the 
region continues to be in conflict with the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian Army, 
with no resolution in the near future.36 There is controversy over how the separatist forces 
are seemingly so well prepared to fight the Ukrainian army. Media sources and a European 
                                                
 
30 Morris, Chris. “Crimea Referendum: Voters ‘Back Russia Union’”. BBC. March 16, 2014. Web. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Rosenberg, Steve. “Ukraine Crisis: Protesters Declare Donetsk ‘Republic’”. BBC. April 7, 2014. Web. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26919928. 
 
33 Amos, Grytsenko and Walker. “Ukraine: Pro-Russia Separatists Set for Victory in Eastern Region 
Referendum”. The Guardian. May 12, 2014. Web. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 MacFarquhar, Neil . "Russia Keeps Its Distance After Ukraine Secession Referendums". The New York 
Times. May 12, 2014. Web. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=1. 
 
36 Miller, Christopher. “Everyone Seems to Have A Peace Plan for Ukraine”. Radio Free Europe. February 
23, 2017. Web. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-peace-plans-fighting-yanukovych-artemenko-
kilimnik/28327624.html. 
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Court decision have claimed that Russia provides assistance, such as equipment and 
personnel, to the separatist forces, prolonging a resolution.37 Denying these allegations, the 
Kremlin claims that the separatists acquired their weapons from local warehouses and not 
from the Russian government.38 Much like the Georgia conflict, Ukraine is left with a 
frozen conflict, which continues decreasing the country’s security and stability. 
         
Aspects of Russian Intervention: Similarities and Developments 
 In many ways, Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine were similar in terms of 
geography, Russia’s use of international agreements to justify its actions, and the presence 
of Russian “compatriots,” individuals with some Russian connection. However, a unique 
feature of Russia’s actions in Ukraine has been the Kremlin’s continued denial of backing 
separatists forces in the eastern Donbas region. This difference represents Russia’s 
evolving warfare strategy and, possibly, an increase in Putin’s risk assessment in his 
decision-making analysis. The following similarities and differences might shed light onto 
how Russia views intervention tactics, which would be useful when analyzing the 
possibility of a future Baltic intervention.  
 
 
                                                
 
37 One example can be found at: Grove, Thomas and Warren Strobel. “Special Report: Where Ukraine’s 
Separatists get their Weapons”. Reuters Online. July 29, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-
crisis-arms-specialreport-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729.; “The General Court upholds the freezing of funds 
of the Russian company Almaz Antey”. General Court of the European Union Press Release. January 25, 
2017. https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-01/cp170006en.pdf.   
 
38 Grove, Thomas and Strobel, Warren.  
  
9 
Bordering Geography with Russia 
 Perhaps geography played a role in the Kremlin’s decision to intervene in Georgia 
and Ukraine. When considering economics and logistics, it would likely be less expensive 
and easier to implement a military action in a bordering state then one across the continent. 
There is also a historical connection, as Ukraine and Georgia were part of the Soviet 
Union.39 However, there is another interesting border development. Apart from the Baltics, 
Russia is bordered by states with frozen conflicts, all of which somehow involved Russia 
either as a participant, mediator or supporter.40 Russia’s indifference in finding a resolution 
to any of these conflicts suggests that the Kremlin is complacent with prolonged instability 
along its borders.41 This is a change from previous Russian preferences. As mentioned 
earlier, Russia was concerned that the violence and instability from the Georgian civil wars 
would spill over into its territory, motivating the Kremlin to mediate conflict resolution 
shortly after the conflicts’ outbreak. Now, the Kremlin seems comfortable with starting 
and supporting conflicts along its border. With this new behavioral tendency, one might 
question if Russia will try to intervene in Estonia and Latvia even though these states are 
NATO members.  
 
 
                                                
39 Orttung, Robert and Christopher Walker. “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts”. The Foreign Policy Group. 
February 13, 2015. Web. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/. 
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid. 
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Russia’s Ability to Create Legitimacy 
 Russia uses the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act to claim that its actions in 
Georgia and Ukraine were legal under the auspices of international law.42 In Georgia, 
Russia argues its military actions were in response to the Russian peacekeepers killed 
during Georgia’s attack on Tshkinvali.43 Article 51 of the UN Charter grants states “the 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”44 Although it could 
be argued that Russian citizens killed in foreign territory, voiding Russia’s right to act on 
Article 51, these peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia to fulfill Russia’s 
obligations in the Sochi Agreements.45 Independent reports confirmed that if Russian 
peacekeepers were harmed, then the use of military force against Georgia would be legal.46  
When acting in self-defense, the goals of the military action should be to restore 
international peace and security.47 Yet, Russian military action continued beyond the initial 
point of conflict, suggesting that Russia’s initial response to Georgia’s attack against 
                                                
42  “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press-Conference After Meeting with Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. August 
12, 2008. http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-
/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/328478.  
 
43 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation,” President of Russia, March 18th, 2014. en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 
 
44 Charter of the United Nations. United Nations. 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Art. 51; Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) Vol. 1. Council of the European 
Union. September, 2009. 
http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_international_fact.cfm. 23.  
 
45 Ibid.: 14. 
 
46 Ibid.: 23. 
 
47 Charter of the United Nations. Art. 51. 
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Russian peacekeepers falls within the rights of the UN Charter, but its advance beyond the 
conflict is illegitimate.48   
Russia has used states’ right to self-determination as justification for recognizing 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s “independence” or for illegally annexing Crimea. Under 
Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter, participating member states agree to “respect…the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”49 The first principle of the 
Helsinki Final Act also gives states the right to self-determination. Using these 
international agreements, the Kremlin has argued it is because of its commitment to 
humanitarianism and international law that it recognizes the “will of the people” by 
recognizing their independence.50  
Russia’s view of international law, however, seems to be selective. If using these 
same texts, Russia’s actions are also illegal. For example, according to international law, 
territories within a nation cannot unilaterally create a new state under the principle of self-
determination.51 Thus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence cannot be 
internationally recognized. In addition, the first principle in the Helsinki Final Act 
guarantees that states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity will be recognized.52 According 
to Article 73 of Ukraine’s constitution, “issues of altering the territory of Ukraine [shall be 
                                                
 
48 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) Vol. 1.. 24. 
 
49 Charter of the United Nations. Art. 1(2). 
 
50 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation”.  
 
51 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia IIFFMCG Vol. 1. 17. 
 
52 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act of Helsinki. August 1, 1975. 
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resolved] exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum.”53 Georgia’s constitution has a 
similar clause in Article 38, stating, “the exercise of minority rights shall not oppose the 
sovereignty, state structure, territorial integrity and political independence of Georgia.”54 
Therefore, by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s “independence” or claiming 
Crimea’s referendum represented the will of the people, allowing for Russian ascension, 
the Kremlin is violating the Helsinki Final Act’s right for state sovereignty.  
Russia argues that Georgia’s breakaway regions should be recognized as 
independent because of the international community’s recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration for independence.55 The Kremlin also tried to use Kosovo’s independence 
again to justify the annexation of Crimea.56 However, the international community 
considered Kosovo to be a unique exception because of the horrific humanitarian violations 
and mass murder of Kosovar Albanians.57 The International Court of Justice has even 
confirmed that the recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was a 
special case.58  
                                                
 
53 Constitution of Ukraine. Government of Ukraine. June 28, 1996. Art. 73. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/profiles/ukraineConstitution_en.asp.  
 
54 Constitution of Georgia. Government of Georgia. August 24, 1995. Art. 38. 
http://www.parliament.ge/files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf. 
 
55 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation”.  
 
56 Somin, Ilya. “Why the Kosovo ‘precedent’ does not justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea”. The 
Washington Post. March, 2014. 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/crimea-kosovo-and-false-moral-
equivalency/?utm_term=.96a1fb7394ad. 
 
57 Ibid. 
 
58 “Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 
Summary of the Advisory Opinion”. The International Court of Justice. The Hague, Netherlands. July, 
2010.  http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf.  
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Russia’s behavior towards the situations in Georgia and Ukraine represent a 
selective reading, interpretation and enforcement of international law by the Kremlin. 
Russia’s frequent inconsistent interpretation of international law shows its ability to use 
texts in its favor, creating its own justification for aggressive actions. The Kremlin’s artful 
use of international law to create legitimacy for its actions suggests that an intervention in 
Estonia or Latvia or proxy support of a separatist movement in the region is not far-fetched.     
 
The Window of Opportunity: Russia’s Compatriot Policy 
 Although geography and legitimacy prepares Russia for a successful and fast 
intervention, the Kremlin’s humanitarian allegations are the most essential feature for 
giving Russia a reason to enter sovereign territory. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia argued 
its actions were for the sake of protecting Russian compatriots abroad, which has been an 
evolving foreign policy strategy since the fall of the Soviet Union. Originally used for 
individuals who formerly had Soviet citizenship, the term “compatriot” now refers to any 
person with “historical, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and spiritual” connection with Russia.59 
Reforms under Putin made it easier to use Russian compatriots as a foreign policy tool. In 
2002, Putin signed “Federal Law No. 62-FZ on Russian Federation Citizenship” in 2002 
that made it easier for former Soviet citizens to receive a Russian passport.60 As of 2016, 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept includes provisions “to ensure comprehensive, effective 
                                                
59 Grigas, Agnia. Beyond Crimea : The New Russian Empire. New Haven ; London: Yale UP, 2016. Print. 
77. 
 
60 Ibid. 
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protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing 
abroad.”61  
Putin’s passport reform likely contributed to the increasing the number of Georgian 
citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia holding a Russian passport. Statistics estimate that 
in 2006, around 50% of South Ossetians and Abkhazians had a Russian passport, but by 
2009, that statistic had jumped to 90%.62 This process of mass dissemination of Russia 
passports became known as “passportization.”63 Distributing passports to South Ossetians 
and Abkhazians was an important strategy for Russia. Unlike in Crimea, where there are 
many Russian speakers, only 1.2% of Georgia speaks Russian as native language.64 By 
distributing passports to these regions, Russia could claim them as compatriots and 
citizens, arguing it is the Kremlin’s responsibility to ensure their safety and well-being.  
In comparison to Georgia, passport distribution played a smaller role in Russia’s 
strategy with Crimea because the Kremlin could claim Russian speakers as compatriots 
living abroad.65 The Kremlin argued its intervention was mandated to protect these 
compatriots against Ukraine’s discriminatory policies, such as state language policies, that 
targeted Russian speakers and forced assimilation.66 Though there were reports of 
                                                
 
61 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation. December 1, 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
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62 Ibid.; 119. 
 
63 Ibid.; 119-120. 
 
64 “Georgia”. World Factbook: Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html.  
 
65 “О внеснии изменений в Федеральный закон ‘О государственной политике Российской 
Федерации в отношении со ответчиков за рубежом’” Президент России. 27 Июля, 2010 г. 
kremlin.ru/acts/bank/31503 доступен в Мае, 2017 г. 
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passports being distributed to Ukrainians in Crimea, Putin’s speech on Crimea highlighted 
the number of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the region instead of the number of 
individuals holding Russian passports.67 
Russia’s intervention in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate the important role of 
Russian compatriots in creating a “window of opportunity” for an intervention. As 
highlighted in these two interventions, a Russian passport or being a Russian-speaker 
creates that window. Claiming these interventions are to protect compatriots abroad likely 
also helps the Kremlin’s public support. Putin cited public opinion surveys that reported 
95% of the population believed the government should protect Russians in Crimea and 
92% support its reunification with Russia.68 The Kremlin’s consistent rhetoric of protecting 
compatriots abroad likely contributes to the high levels of support by overshadowing the 
aggressive aspects with a softer humanitarian goal.  
Russia’s humanitarian “window of opportunity” should be concerning to Estonia 
and Latvia. Recent reforms in Russian policy has broadly defined a “compatriot” as 
possessing a cultural or linguistic connection with Russia, making it easier for the Kremlin 
to categorize its aggression as a humanitarian mission to protect compatriots living abroad. 
Since roughly 30% of the population in Estonia and Latvia are Russian speakers, the 
Kremlin might be able to pursue a humanitarian agenda in these states as well.69  
                                                
66 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation”.  
 
67 “Why Crimea is so dangerous”. BBC. March 2014. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26367786. 
 
68 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation”. 
 
69 “Estonia”. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html; “Latvia”. The World Factbook. 
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Russia’s Evolving War Strategy for a New Generation 
 The most significant difference between Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and 
Georgia is the increase in unconventional tactics to pursue its political objectives. 
According to the United States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military terms, 
unconventional warfare involves 
 
“Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force.” 70 
 
Analysts have started referring to the blend of conventional and unconventional strategies, 
including covert affairs and disinformation campaigns, as “hybrid warfare,” with “hybrid 
threats” referring to the adversary who engages in hybrid warfare.71 
 Discourse on Russia’s use of hybrid tactics gained momentum during the 2014 
Maidan protests in Ukraine.72 Many analysts started referring to a 2013 article by Russia’s 
Chief of the General Staff Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov titled, “The Value of Science 
                                                
Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/lg.html.  
70 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, DOD Terminology Program, 2017, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 245. 
 
71 Landler, Mark and Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity by Putin on Ukraine,” The 
New York Times, July 8, 2014. 
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/europe/nato-chief-warns-of-duplicity-by-putin-on-ukraine.html?_r=1; 
Hoffman, Frank. “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, July 
28, 2014. warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/. 
 
72 McDermott, Roger N. “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?”. Parameters 46.1 (2016): 97-
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is in Foresight” as being the key to understanding Russian modern warfare strategy.73 In 
his article, Gerasimov comments on the increase in “asymmetrical actions” in conflict, 
largely by the West, with the goal of creating an internal opposition in a sovereign nation 
before intervening through conventional means of sending in “peacekeeping” forces to 
change the political leadership.74 Gerasimov views the colour revolutions and the Arab 
Spring as examples when “a thriving state can…become a victim of foreign intervention, 
and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.”75 Though recent 
articles by military analysts, such as Michael Kofman, have cautioned against viewing 
Gerasimov’s strategy as Russia’s new military doctrine, the Kremlin faces a dilemma in 
developing ways to counter these perceived western hybrid threats, possibly through hybrid 
strategies of its own.76 Furthermore, if Russia is creating its own hybrid strategies to 
counter threats, it is likely these strategies would be used in a Kremlin offensive attack.  
 The best example of Russia’s use of unconventional tactics was during the Ukraine 
conflict. Though the annexation and advancement of troops in Crimea displays many 
characteristics of a conventional operation, Ukraine’s eastern war in the Donbas region is 
different.77 As mentioned earlier, reports have accused the Kremlin of supplying military 
                                                
 
73 McDermott, Roger N. 98. 
 
74 Gerasimov, Valery. “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New challenges demand rethinking the 
forms and methods of carrying out combat operations,” Military Review, 2016. 
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75 Ibid., 24. 
 
76 Kofman, Michael. “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts”. War on the Rocks. March 11, 2016. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/; McDermott, Roger N., 
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equipment and personnel to the separatist forces in Ukraine’s eastern region, which the 
government has repeatedly denied. This strategy could be described from Gerasimov’s lists 
of non-military measures as the “formulation of the political opposition” and “actions of 
opposition forces,” which occur at the beginning stages of conflict.78 The peculiarity in this 
behavior is not the possibility of Russia supporting proxy forces, history provides plenty 
of examples when powerful states have participated in proxy wars, but rather that the 
Kremlin is covertly supporting these opposition forces. Russia openly supported the South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian militias in Georgia. Why would Ukraine be any different? 
Ukraine, like Georgia, is not a NATO member, thereby reducing the risk of mass retaliation 
from the West. Furthermore, a 2015 poll conducted by Pew Research Center reported a 
majority of Russians believed the “people’s republics” should become independent states 
(35%) or join Russia (24%).79  
 Russia’s expanded use of non-conventional warfare tactics could increase its 
chances of trying similar tactics in Estonia and Latvia. The Kremlin has executed two 
successful interventions in bordering states by pursuing a plan strategically catered to the 
environment.80 With Estonia and Latvia being NATO members, the strategy of 
nonconventional tactics would be the best chance of Russia conducting a successful 
campaign, as conventional warfare with Russian troops would likely cause a NATO 
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response. If implemented correctly, Russia could try to intervene and destabilize one of 
these Baltic states through non-conventional means. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The analysis above shows the lessons learned from analyzing Russia’s actions in 
Georgia and Ukraine. The similarities and difference described could be a harbinger for 
Estonia and Latvia’s national security. Sharing a border with Russia would make it easier 
and less expensive for the Kremlin to develop and engage in an intervention. If Russia were 
to engage or support any destabilizing movements in these countries, the Kremlin has 
shown brashness and capability of using international agreements to justify its actions. In 
addition, Russia seems to engage in areas where governments are allegedly suppressing the 
rights and ignoring the well-being of Russian compatriots abroad. Estonia and Latvia’s 
large Russian-speaking population could create the necessary “window of opportunity” for 
the Kremlin to intervene. Finally, Russia’s increased use of non-conventional warfare 
could increase the likelihood of interfering in a NATO member state, as this would 
decrease the likelihood of a NATO response due to transparency issues. However, before 
Russia would take the risk of interfering in a NATO state, there would have to be a 
“window of opportunity”. The next section analyzes the demographics in Estonia and 
Latvia to assess if Russia would be able to create a reason or motivation in future 
endeavors. 
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CHAPTER II 
COULD THE BALTICS BE RUSSIA’S NEXT TARGET? 
 
 Since the annexation of the Crimea, analysts have questioned if the Baltic states 
could be Putin’s next target, specifically Estonia and Latvia.81 There are several reasons 
why analysts wonder if the Baltic states could be threatened. First, like Ukraine and 
Georgia, these states were part of the U.S.S.R, though the United States never officially 
recognized their annexation.82 If Putin’s goal is to expand Russia’s borders to incorporate 
former republics or support an opposition movement to bring instability to the region, these 
states could be a viable target. Second, the Baltic’s bordering location could make any 
military action on the ground less expensive and thus more likely than an intervention 
further west. Third, there is a large Russian-speaking minority population in both states.  
 Although military action in Georgia and Ukraine was undoubtedly audacious, 
engaging in conventional military action in a NATO member state would be a sharp 
escalation in Russian foreign policy behavior. If using the previous interventions as a 
baseline to predict future Russian behavior, the decision to intervene would likely take 
place under a specific condition. This means, there would be a sizeable Russian-speaking 
population in a bordering nation that the Kremlin could call “compatriots” and accusations 
from the Kremlin that the Baltic governments are violating the rights of these individuals. 
This section discusses the distribution of Russian and Baltic language speakers in Estonia 
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and Latvia and examines Russia’s humanitarian criticism that Baltic legislations is 
subjecting minority Russian speakers to harsher living conditions.  
 
Russian Speakers in the Baltics: The Window of Opportunity 
 After their incorporation into the Soviet Union, the Baltic states experienced an 
influx of Russian speakers. The Soviets also implemented a strict russification policy that 
required residents to learn and use Russian, the official language of the U.S.S.R., in their 
daily life.83 After the fall of the Soviet Union, some ethnic Russians returned to the Russian 
Federation, but many remained.84 From 1989 to 2011, the percentage of citizens identified 
as ethnic Russians in Latvia decreased from 34% to 27% and in Estonia decreased from 
30% to 25%.85 As seen below, the percentage of individuals that are considered Russian 
speakers in both states is slightly higher than these numbers. There are several reasons to 
explain this difference. First, these statistics represent those who identify as ethnic Russians 
based on nationality. There could be some citizens who identify Russian as their mother 
tongue, but who identify with a different nationality. Second, both states have a percentage 
of the population considered “stateless”, defined by the UN as individuals who reside 
outside of their own country, but are not able to acquire citizenship in another, either by 
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choice or bureaucratic measures.86 In Latvia, these individuals are titled “non-citizens” and 
in Estonia “persons with undetermined citizenship.”87 It is not clear if these populations 
were included in recent statistics reporting on the number of Russian speakers in Estonia 
and Latvia.  
The number of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers could play an important role 
in Russia’s decision on engaging in a conflict with Estonia or Latvia in the future. Not only 
could the Kremlin label these individuals as compatriots, but also these communities might 
feel more connected to Russian culture because of their heritage or language background. 
It is important to note the number of ethnic Russians in both countries, but also important 
to reiterate that Russia considers any Russian-speaking person as a compatriot, making the 
level of Russian speakers more important to the Kremlin than only those with Russian 
ethnicity. If the Kremlin were to implement any political or military destabilization 
strategy, Russian-speaking communities would likely serve as the hot spots for building a 
support base for the Kremlin.  
Available data shows the distribution of Russian speakers to Baltic language 
speakers is comparable to the distribution between Russian speakers and Ukrainian 
speakers in Ukraine. The analysis below shows the similarity between these distributions 
to draw a parallel between the demographics in these Baltic states and Ukraine. Comparing 
the number of Russian speakers in Georgia’s South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions is not 
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as useful because Russia did not use “language” as an indicator of a compatriot. As 
mentioned earlier, the Kremlin issued passports to members in these communities, claimed 
these individuals as compatriots after its passportization campaign and used documentation 
as an indicator rather than language spoken at home. Therefore, Georgia has been omitted 
from the comparative analysis below.  
 
 
Though neither surpassing nor matching the amount of Baltic speakers, Latvia and 
Estonia’s Russian-speaking population is still significant. As seen in Figure 1, Russian 
speakers account for 30% of the population in Estonia, whereas Estonian speakers account 
Figure 1: Data showing the language distribution of Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia 
and their respective regions with a large Russian-speaking population, Ida-Viru County in 
Estonia and the Latgale Region in Latvia. Statistics were acquired from the official databank 
for the Statistics of Estonia and the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 
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for 69% of the population.88 In Latvia, the distribution of Russian to Latvian speakers is 
slightly less extreme, with 34% of the population identifying as Russian speakers and 56% 
of the population identifying as Latvian speakers.89 These statistics are similar to 
Ukraine’s, where 29% of the total population consider Russian to be their mother tongue 
and about 68% percent consider Ukrainian.90 The comparable levels of Russian speakers 
between these three countries and their history as former Soviet republics suggests that 
Russia might see these Baltic states as a security interest. This would increase the 
likelihood of future Russian interference, either through conventional or non-conventional 
means.  
Though a minority population, there are areas in Estonia and Latvia where many 
residents consider Russian as their native language. These areas also share a border with 
Russia. In Estonia’s northeastern region, over 80% of citizens living in Ida-Viru county are 
Russian speakers.91 In Narva, Ida-Viru’s major city, over 80% of residents are Russian 
speakers.92 Though less severe, the Latgale region in south-eastern Latvia has a similar 
trend, with 55% of the population labeling Russian as their mother tongue and only 35% 
labeling Latvian.93 However, Latgale’s major city, Daugavpits, has a larger majority of 
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Russian speakers at 79%.94 The Kremlin might hope to exploit this portion of the 
population to pursue a political objective. 
 
 
A comparison of recent government censuses reveals a similar distribution of 
Russian speakers to state-language speakers in Ukraine.95 The 2001 government census 
shows 90% of the population in Crimea were considered Russian speakers.96 Luhansk and 
Donetsk also recorded a high percentage of Russian speakers, 69% and 75% respectively.97 
This similarity could lead the Kremlin to believe that an intervention in Latvia or Estonia 
could be as successful as it was Ukraine. If the ratio of Russian speaker to non-Russian 
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Figure 2: Data showing the distribution of Russian speakers to Ukrainian speakers in Ukraine’s 
conflict areas. Data was acquired from Ukrainian’s official databank from the State Committee 
of Statistics.   
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speaker is a factor in Russia’s decision-making process for engagement, Estonia and 
Latvia’s similar numbers to Ukraine’s suggest that these populations could create a 
“window of opportunity” for Russian intervention. If the first step is to identify a sizeable 
Russian-speaking population, the next step is to assess if these populations are subjected 
to government discrimination. Under this condition, the Kremlin could justify future 
military engagement in the name of humanitarian principles, like it did in Georgia, or 
support an opposition movement, like it continues to do in Ukraine.  
 
The Humanitarian Argument 
The Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia have caught the attention 
of the Kremlin, whose foreign policy agenda includes protecting the interest of the 
international Russian-speaking community and “compatriots” abroad.98 As seen in Georgia 
and Ukraine, Russia uses its self-declared obligation to protect Russian compatriots abroad 
to interfere in sovereign nations.99 If desired, Russia could attempt to create a pro-Russian 
or, at least, an anti-government movement by exploiting the hardships allegedly hurting 
Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia. Ida-Viru County and Latgale would 
be prime targets for such a campaign, as both areas share a border with Russia and have a 
large Russian-speaking population.  
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Russian officials have already been voicing concern for the protection of Russian 
speakers in Estonia and Latvia. Though acknowledging that states have the right to govern 
as they see fit, Russia has also argued that Estonian and Latvian legislation has indirectly 
discriminated against Russian speakers.100 These claims largely focus on government 
policies that the Kremlin argues has limited Russian speakers’ access to equal opportunity 
and forces many to be labeled as “non-citizens.”101 This section uses demographic data and 
international reports to assess Russia’s argument on discrimination.  
 
Factor 1: The Quality of Life in Minority Communities 
The Kremlin could use the hardships faced by Russian-speaking communities to 
justify any future actions in the Baltics. Government statistics from Estonia and Latvia 
report higher levels of poverty and unemployment in Ida-Viru and Latgale, in comparison 
to national levels, suggesting an economic disparity between Russian speakers and the 
majority population (Figure 3 & 4). Statistics show that areas with a large Russian-speaking 
population suffer from higher levels of unemployment.102 From Estonia and Latvia’s most 
recent census in 2011, Ida-Viru County and the Latgale region recorded the highest levels 
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of unemployment rates and at-risk-poverty rates.103 Both states have experienced a 
reduction in unemployment rates since this census, yet, Ida-Viru County and Latgale’s 
statistics have recorded the least improvement. For example, in 2016, Estonia recorded a 
country unemployment rate of 6.8, down from 12.3 in 2011, with Ida-Viru County still 
recording the highest rate at 13.5, followed by Polva County at 10.2 (Figure 3).104 In the 
same year, Latvia also recorded a lower country unemployment rate of 9.9, down from 
16.5 in 2011, but Latgale’s rate decreased by only 1% (Figure 3).105  
These statistics suggest that regions with a large Russian-speaking population 
struggle economically more than the Baltic majority population. Reasons for high 
unemployment could be environmental. For example, less developed regions could 
experience higher unemployment rates because of limited employment opportunities in 
comparison to the population number. In this case, one would expect higher unemployment 
rates regardless of the number of Russian speakers. Even areas with a Baltic language-
speaking majority would struggle with employment. However, government policies could 
also play a role. Both Estonia and Latvia have language policies that could restrict Russian 
speakers’ access to employment, thereby contributing to the higher unemployment rates in 
Ida-Viru and Latgale.  
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Figure 3: Data from 2011 Census of Estonia and Latvia acquired from official databank of the 
Statistics of Estonia and Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 
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Figure 4: Data from 2011 Census of Estonia and Latvia acquired from official databank of 
the Statistics of Estonia and Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
  
30 
 
According to Estonia’s Language Act, all employees in state agencies, local 
governments, legal positions, and organizations that serve the “public interest” are required 
to show an advanced level of Estonian for employment.106 Employees are required to 
demonstrate their advanced proficiency by passing a language exam.107 Likewise, Latvia’s 
Language Law also requires an advanced level of Latvian in government or partially 
government positions and in a private institution that offers a public service.108 These 
requirements might limit employment options for Russian speakers, who do not meet the 
government’s level of advanced proficiency. Using Russian could prevent citizens from 
finding employment or put them at risk for termination if they do not use the state language 
at their job. 
In response to Russia’s allegations, some Baltic officials have claimed that the well-
being of minorities are a national concern.109 Legislation reflects these governments’ 
attempts to tackle discrimination. In 2004, Latvia passed the Labor Law, which prohibited 
discrimination or unfair treatment based on gender, race, color, age, disability, religion, 
and national or social origin.110 Estonia passed a similar law, titled the Equal Treatment 
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Act, in 2008, that sought to “ensure the protection of persons against discrimination” on 
similar factors to the Latvian law.111 However, language, which the European Union 
considers a form of “indirect ethnic discrimination”, is not included in either pieces of 
legislation.112 According to Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, “language,” is considered grounds for discrimination in addition to 
nationality and ethnic origin.113 Though one could argue that discrimination based on 
language is implied through the inclusion of ethnic or national origin, it is very plausible 
that these governments purposefully omitted language as a factor of discrimination. If 
Estonia or Latvia had truly wanted to ensure that its new legislation abided by all anti-
discrimination laws in the European Union, “language” would have been established as 
grounds for discrimination.  
Recent reports from the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance (ECRI) identified Estonia and Latvia’s language policies as being a likely 
barrier against employment opportunities. The 2012 report on Latvia noted the 
government’s strict implementation of the Language Law for employment, requiring 
advanced proficiency in both the public and private sector.114 This could deter Russian 
speakers from obtaining employment.115 Commenting that legislation aiming to protect a 
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state language is legitimate and does not inherently lead to discrimination, the report also 
notes that legislation could lead to indirect discrimination when strictly implemented in an 
unnecessary environment.116 For example, in areas with a Russian-speaking majority, it 
could be beneficial to employ individuals who have a strong grasp on the Russian language, 
especially in the public sector. This skill could help explain laws or public services to the 
individuals who have a low level of Latvian proficiency. For this reason, ECRI has 
recommended to “take all necessary measures to ensure a balanced implementation of the 
state’s Language Law.117 Flexibility in its implementation could actually be in the public’s 
interest.    
ECRI’s report on Estonia commented on similar concerns on indirect 
discrimination. The report noted that areas with a Russian-speaking majority are less 
economically developed and experience higher levels of unemployment.118 Furthermore, 
there is little indication that the government is developing a solution to this problem, as 
there is not any system to evaluate or monitor levels of equality in the country that could 
be used for policy development.119 To tackle this problem, ECRI suggests evaluating the 
implementation of the Language Act in Russian-speaking areas to identify if the legislation 
allows for indirect discrimination against non-Estonian speakers.120  
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Both of the most recent ECRI reports commented on the economic disadvantages 
of Russian speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia. ECRI recommends the Estonian 
government evaluating the effects of its legislation and recommends the Latvian authorities 
to enforce the state language policy only when there is a “legitimate public interest” and 
allow more flexibility in areas with a non-Latvian speaking majority.121 Such 
recommendations reveal the Council of Europe’s concern that these language policies are 
contributing to the disparity in unemployment levels, disadvantaging Russian speakers and 
other minority communities.  
Although higher unemployment rates likely generate higher rates of poverty, 
problems with state pensions could also be a factor. Again, this problem has affected 
former U.S.S.R citizens more than ethnic Latvians and Estonians. According to Estonia’s 
State Pension Insurance Act and Latvia’s Law on Pensions, individuals are eligible for old-
age pension only if they have worked in the country for at least fifteen years.122 This means, 
if an individual retired after 15 years of working in Estonia or Latvia, but had an additional 
15 years of work experience in a different Soviet republic, these years would not be counted 
towards the calculation of a pensioner’s monthly payment.  
Latvia and Estonia’s new pension policies left many older adults at a disadvantage, 
especially transplanted ethnic Russians. Any previous Soviet work experience in a different 
republic would not apply towards their work history, consequently lowering their monthly 
pension payment. Though this disadvantage is not permanent, it could still effect today’s 
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older population. For example, an 80-year-old pensioner was 56 when the Soviet Union 
dissolved. If that individual had worked in the Soviet Union since the age of 22, but only 
Estonia or Latvia since the age of 42, the first 20 years did not apply towards their pension.  
Statistics do not show how this effects specifically ethnic Russians in comparison 
to the majority population. However, it is important to note that Ida-Viru County, where 
about 73% of residents are ethnic Russians, has recorded the second lowest monthly 
payment in the country over the last five years.123 This suggests that ethnic Russians 
retiring in Estonia might be receiving lower pension payments then the ethnic Estonians. 
Unfortunately, Latvia does not provide pension statistics as detailed as Estonia. However, 
considering the pension laws are similar, one can assume a similar disparity is present.  
Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia are struggling more than the rest of the 
ethnic population. As described above, language policies, a lack of legal protection against 
language discrimination, and each states’ pension system disadvantages non-Baltic 
language speakers. The above statistics from Latvian and Estonian databanks corroborate 
the Kremlin’s allegations that these governments are indirectly withholding the Russian-
speaking community from enjoying equal opportunities in comparison to the majority 
population. Though the policies and social institutions do not specifically target Russian 
speakers, the rules and regulations subsequently disadvantage minority communities, 
particularly ethnic Russians. 
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Factor 2: The Issue of Statelessness 
 In addition to economic disadvantages, Russia also claims that the Baltic 
governments’ are denying former Soviet citizens, many who are Russian speakers, the right 
to nationality, forcing these individuals to live as “stateless.”124 Recent reports estimate 
that 6% of Estonia’s population and about 12% of Latvia’s are currently considered 
stateless.125 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has argued that these Russian speakers 
are denied political and socio-economic rights because of their “non-citizen” status.126 The 
ministry has also accused Baltic authorities of ignoring recommendations from 
international organizations to confront the issue of statelessness, thereby explicitly failing 
to protect the human rights of Russian speakers.127 Again, the Kremlin could use this issue 
as a foreign policy tool. For example, any future Russian intervention into a region with a 
Russian-speaking majority could be justified in the name of protecting these citizens 
against government discrimination.  
Statelessness became a contentious issue in the Baltic region after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Under Estonia and Latvia’s new citizenship, individuals who could show 
ethnic origin to the titular nation automatically received citizenship.128 Others could choose 
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to apply for Russian citizenship or become naturalized citizens.129 If choosing the latter, 
individuals must pass a language exam, demonstrating an advanced fluency in the state 
language.130 Those who decided not to apply for any citizenship, Russian or Baltic, or 
applied for naturalized citizenship, but failed to pass the exam, were labeled as “non-
citizens,” “stateless,” or an “alien”.131 Statements from the Foreign Ministry convey the 
Kremlin’s objection to this process, arguing that the local governments do not provide 
affordable access to state language education and that the exam is too difficult for Russian 
speakers, especially elderly learners.132  
 Non-citizens are not allowed to exercise the same rights as citizens, even though 
many have lived in the Baltics since the Soviet occupation. For example, Latvian non-
citizens cannot vote in elections, denying these individuals the right to influence the 
political environment in their own community.133 On the other hand, Estonians holding a 
gray “alien” passport, considered legal documentation for non-citizens, can vote in local 
elections, but are not allowed to join any political parties.134 Estonian NGO’s that focus on 
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the rights of non-Estonian speakers argue that restricting the rights of stateless persons is 
creating an environment of social marginalization and disconnect because of this political 
isolation.135  
 Reports from the United Nations Human Rights Council shows the international 
community’s concern about the status of these stateless individuals. Regarding Estonia, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights commended the government for 
making some strides in combatting the problem with statelessness by easing requirements 
for children born in Estonia to stateless parents and exempting those 65 and older from 
passing the language exam to qualify for naturalization.136 However, the council also noted 
the recent decrease of citizens seeking naturalization, possibly because the language exam 
is too difficult.137 In another statement, the Latvian Human Rights Council for the UN 
lauded the Latvian government after easing regulations for children to acquire citizenship, 
but also noticed other amendments to its citizenship law that allowed the government to 
deny applicants citizenship without judicial review on “vague security grounds.”138 The 
council also critiqued the continued restriction of rights to non-citizens, such as the right 
to vote, create political parties and restricted access to work or some pensions.139  
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Concerning these developments, the UN has recommended the Estonian and 
Latvian governments focus more attention on the problem of statelessness, but 
recommendations are broad. For example, to address this issue in Estonia, the council 
recommends that “Estonia facilitate the acquisition of Estonian citizenship by persons with 
the status of “non-citizens” and address obstacles encountered by applicants,” yet does not 
suggest specific methods to accomplish these goals.140 Nevertheless, the fact that UN 
committees and councils have reported on the issue of statelessness with concern and 
offered recommendations indicate the humanitarian importance of this problem. 
The barriers faced by non-citizens could contribute to an increased level of 
animosity towards the government and social marginalization. If stateless persons feel the 
government does not represent their well-being, these individuals might feel isolated from 
society and, subsequently, search for another community. Perhaps this sentiment is already 
developing. Recent analysis from the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences reported a drop in 
the number of Latvian non-citizens feeling a “sense of belonging” to Latvia.141 If this trend 
continues, the subsequent national division could be dangerous for Estonia and Latvia’s 
national security. Labeling these governments as discriminatory, the Kremlin could inspire 
an opposition movement, hoping the movement will gain enough momentum to destabilize 
the governments. However, the success and level of impact would depend on unpredictable 
environmental factors. If the movement gained momentum, it could have a substantial 
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impact on the stability of the domestic government. However, if authorities could quickly 
squash the movement, the impact would likely be minor.  
 
Summary of Analysis 
 Though there might not be an immediate threat of imminent conflict, analysts 
should not underestimate the Kremlin’s potential for causing disruption in the Baltics 
because of the presence of a struggling Russian-speaking community. Russia’s previous 
interventions have revealed the Kremlin’s ability to take advantage of the current 
environment in a bordering nation for political gains. To date, this environment has 
included the exploitation of Russian speakers and compatriots facing government barriers 
for prosperity or discrimination. Estonia and Latvia’s Russian-speaking regions facing 
disparate social and economic challenges could be the catalyst for Russian aggression.  
Any conflict developments against Estonia or Latvia would involve the use of 
international treaties to justify Russian actions. For example, Russia could use the Helsinki 
Final Act or the UN’s position on statelessness to justify any actions taken in the name of 
protecting the 12% of stateless persons in Latvia. Though the international community 
would likely reject and refute such claims, Russia’s past behavior shows the Kremlin’s 
disregard for international norms. Criticism against Russia’s selective interpretations of 
international agreements has not stalled the Kremlin’s actions in the past and, therefore, 
might not in the future. 
Of course, the consequences of engaging with a NATO member state are higher 
than with non-NATO states. It is certainly true that had Georgia or Ukraine been NATO 
members, Russia might have decided to refrain from military engagement. However, 
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perhaps the higher stakes merely warrant a different strategy. Russia’s adaptability in the 
Georgian and Ukrainian conflict might indicate the Kremlin’s view of NATO as a barrier 
to overcome instead of a barrier to avoid. NATO, however, might not have completely 
prepared its members to confront a 21st century adversary that uses Russia’s adaptable 
strategy.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONVENTIONAL STRENGTHS AND NON-CONVENTIONAL 
WEAKNESSES OF NATO 
 
Since its beginning, NATO and Russia have had a contentious relationship. In 1949, 
the United States and 11 western European countries came together to sign the North 
Atlantic Treaty, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).142 One of the 
objectives of NATO was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
down.”143 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was created to act as the decision-making 
political body of the alliance, discussing security issues with all members as needed.144 
According to Article 4, a member can call the Parties together to discuss any security 
concerns or perceived threats from an outside state.145 If all the members of the NAC feel 
it is necessary, the council can vote to invoke Article 5, the mutual defense clause of the 
North Atlantic Treaty.146 It is this clause that is considered the greatest strength of the 
alliance, bringing great risk to any adversary willing to threaten the security of alliance 
members. 
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NATO has conducted seven rounds of enlargement, with the next ascension to 
include Montenegro scheduled for June 2017.147 Estonia and Latvia joined NATO during 
the fifth round of enlargement in 2004. Russia has consistently objected to NATO 
enlargement, arguing that the alliance is a threat to Russian national security.148 NATO, on 
the other hand, has maintained that the alliance’s purpose is to “promote stability and well-
being in the North Atlantic area” through its commitment to democracy and collective 
defence.149 Russia’s continued criticism of the alliance represents the Kremlin’s suspicion 
of NATO.  
Recent studies from the Center for Strategic and International Studies have claimed 
that the Kremlin’s international political objective is to break the dominant influence of 
western institutions, such as NATO, to disrupt the international order and regain a regional 
position of power in the new status quo.150 Discrediting NATO’s commitment to mutual 
defense would be the ultimate victory in international politics for Russia. To accomplish 
this, the Kremlin could try to destabilize the national security of a NATO state. In this case, 
Estonia or Latvia would be a prime target because of their bordering geography with 
Russia.     
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Gains and Losses of a Baltic Intervention 
Though risky, there could be some benefits from interfering in one of the Baltic 
states. Scholars from the Carnegie Moscow Center have commented on the relationship 
between Putin’s approval ratings and international interventions. Putin’s popularity 
increased domestically after both the Georgia and Ukraine conflict, which could imply that 
the population approves of his international endeavors.151 Recent polls from the 
independent polling organization Levada Center in 2015 reported that over 50% of those 
polled would either fully “want” or “probably want” Russia to expand its borders to 
incorporate Russian-speaking territories.152 This means that the public might be in favor of 
a Russian intervention in a Russian-speaking region in the Baltics. Putin might try to use 
Russian foreign policy to increase domestic support during periods of Russian political 
instability or perhaps during the 2018 presidential elections.  
There is an interesting discrepancy in the above-mentioned poll. Though 50% of 
those polled would “probably want” to incorporate Russian-speaking territories into 
Russia, only 15% considered annexation as an appropriate method to deal with states that 
are discriminating against Russian-speaking populations, even if it is the will of the 
territory.153 Furthermore, only 8% believed Russia should send in small military forces to 
protect these individuals.154 Although many would likely favor expanding Russia’s 
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territory to include more Russian-speaking populations, it does not appear to be the 
country’s preferred method for solving international humanitarian conflicts.  
Interestingly, the Levada Center reported that 87% of the population supported the 
annexation of Crimea, a strange number considering how many responded negatively to 
using annexation to resolve humanitarian conflicts.155 This inconsistency might further 
demonstrate the important role government can play in public opinion and support. A 2016 
study by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence analyzed online and 
social media to differentiate between the Russian and Ukrainian perspectives of the conflict 
in the Donbas (NATO StratCom 2016). Research found that Russia uses strategic linguistic 
framing, selective images, and trolls to “create a positive image of itself, justify its actions, 
support diplomatic activity and military actions.”156 For example, an about 87% of 
comments found on pro-Russia media sources did not portray Russia’s actions in Crimea 
as aggressive.157 In contrast, 87% of comments on pro-Ukrainian media and 55% of 
comments from “balanced sources” viewed Russia’s actions in Crimea as aggressive.158 
These statistics suggest a correlation between the way pro-Russian sources portray events 
and the effects it has on readers. Pro-Russian media, offering a stark alternative to western 
media, can effectively alter the perspective of its readers. Therefore, although the Levada 
Center’s poll indicates that the population is not in favor of aggressive foreign policy, the 
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Russian government’s strategic use of biased media has an effect on public opinion and 
support for the Kremlin.  
Intervening in Latvia and Estonia would be riskier than Ukraine or Georgia because 
both are members of NATO. However, if Putin’s objective is to destabilize or undermine 
western institutions, NATO states could be a target.159 Putin has long objected to NATO 
expansion, labeling the alliance as a direct threat to Russian international security.160 Many 
NATO officials have repeatedly disregarded Russia’s claims that enlargement was aimed 
to target Russia, emphasizing that it is every sovereign country’s right to seek membership 
into the alliance and that membership is not forced upon them by the West.161 However, 
the prospects of destabilizing NATO, a perceived threat to Russian security, and increasing 
political support for the Kremlin might Russia to consider ways to interfere with NATO 
states.   
        Although there are advantages in possible Russian interference in Estonia and Latvia, 
there is also the risk of retaliation from NATO. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
represents the member states’ commitment to mutual defense. If one member state was 
attacked, all other members are expected to respond. The concept of mutual defence was 
an important feature of deterring the threat of a Soviet invasion.162 Yet the alliances 
commitment to mutual defence might be in jeopardy. Recent media coverage has expressed 
the United States’ frustration with member states not adhering to their financial 
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commitment, which includes contributing 2% of a state’s national Gross Domestic Product 
to the alliance.163 Although it is true that many states fall short of this threshold, Estonia 
has repeatedly met this requirement and Latvia is reportedly on target to as well.164 Estonia 
and Latvia’s deep commitment to fulfill their financial responsibilities likely reflect their 
belief in the alliance as well as their sense of national security risk, perhaps fearing Russian 
aggression. Although there have been questions of NATO’s purpose and the commitment 
of its members, the Baltic states have been adhering to the alliances principle objectives, 
making an allied response to a direct threat of their national security more likely than other 
states.  
  
The Conventional Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO 
        NATO’s international military and the mutual defence clause are strengths of the 
alliance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO’s military has engaged in multiple 
missions that have resulted in political transitions, with Kosovo (1999) being heavily 
disputed by the Russian government.165 Interventions like the one in Kosovo demonstrate 
NATO’s ability to change the political landscape in a sovereign state through military 
force. The political strength of the mutual defence clause was evident after the 9/11 attacks 
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on the United States, the only instance of the Allies invoking Article 5.166 However, this 
was more a symbolic act of support for the United States to respond individually in self-
defense, as NATO forces were not directly involved in the United States’ response until 
later.167  
Although NATO’s powerful military and commitment to mutual defence are 
strengths of the North Atlantic Treaty, they can also be weaknesses. Two problems that 
could arise if NATO suddenly faced aggressive Russian actions are: a problem with 
accessibility and a problem with the consensus of members. The first problem concerns 
having immediate access to the appropriate military personnel and equipment for a 
defensive response. Although NATO’s military includes high numbers of equipment and 
experienced personnel, it might not be accessible to defend a Baltic incursion. The second 
problem concerns the NAC’s ability to reach a consensus on what constitutes an “armed 
attack” and what characterizes the appropriate response.  
  
Problems with Accessibility 
NATO’s defensive capability to stop a Russian Baltic invasion might be less 
effective than its previous endeavors. A 2016 report from the RAND Corporation 
examining war games from 2014 and 2015 concluded that Russia would need, at most, 60 
hours to take over Talinn and Riga because of advantages in accessibility due to geography 
(RAND 2016). For instance, from the Russian border, Tallinn is approximately 200km 
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away and Riga is roughly 210 km.168 NATO forces entering from the Polish border would 
have to travel 600 km to Tallinn and 325km to Riga.169 Moreover, NATO troops would 
have to cross the “Kaliningrad corridor” along Belarus and Russia, putting troops at risk of 
long-range artillery fire.170 The natural geographic barriers greatly advantage Russia, who 
could quickly move into the Baltics to capture Tallinn and Riga before the Allies could 
send in help to defend them.  
According to RAND, it would take several weeks for NATO or U.S. military 
reinforcements to arrive for Baltic support.171 The issue of reinforcements is important 
because of the discrepancy in size and power of Baltic and Russian military forces. Most 
NATO forces in the region belong to the Baltics and are small light infantry battalions, 
which would have a difficult time defending Russia’s estimated 22 available battalions.172 
If left unchanged, the fate of the Baltic states could rely on the Kremlin’s decision to 
invade, which would be difficult to predict.   
The RAND report also emphasized the difficult choices NATO would face under a 
Russian offensive attack: launch a risky counteroffensive that carries the risk of escalation, 
threaten Moscow with a “massive retaliation” of nuclear weapons, or concede to Russian 
occupation and possibly destroy the alliance altogether.173 However, the authors posit that 
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sending in three additional armed brigades could deter such an attack and that this expense 
would be a logical move.174 The RAND report demonstrates that NATO’s successful past 
might not indicate a successful future without some changes.  
  
Problems with Consensus 
If confronted with Russian aggression, NATO might have a problem reaching a 
consensus on how to respond. Koremenos (2001) argues that larger numbers in institutions 
can make cooperation more difficult.175 A problem with cooperation might stem from the 
framing of Article 5, which states that: 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”176 
  
An “armed attack” is not defined anywhere in the treaty and is not in the current NATO 
handbook of definitions. The most similar term available is “armed forces - an entire 
military forces of a nation.”177 From this, perhaps an armed attack could be interpreted as 
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any offensive action that threatens the sovereignty or territorial integrity of a member state. 
However, as mentioned earlier, part of Russia’s operation in Crimea included a unit of 
unidentified armed men, which Putin claimed were “Crimean self-defense forces” 
storming the parliament building. If a similar event happened in a Russian-speaking region 
in the Baltics, Allies might disagree on whether it is necessary to risk further escalation for 
the actions of unmarked forces. Using a strategy of unmarked armed forces may delay a 
NATO response, which could carry drastic consequences.  
If the members collectively decided to respond to an adversary, they might disagree 
on the method or proportion of the response. Article 5 states that members are expected to 
implement any response they “deem necessary”, which could include the use of “armed 
force”. Although all party members might agree to respond to an offensive attack, some 
might prefer responding through military actions while others could prefer implementing 
sanctions. Disagreements like these could weaken the alliance’s ability to respond to an 
adversary.  
There are several reasons why there could be a disagreement among NATO 
members. First, the NAC is a consensus decision-making institution with 28 current 
members. Large membership increases the risk of one country objecting, inhibiting the 
allies from agreeing on a response strategy. A 2008 questionnaire taken after Russia’s 
actions in Georgia further demonstrates this risk. According to the report, 50% of the 
population in Italy and 35% in Germany would “strongly oppose” if Russia were to pursue 
a similar campaign in the Baltics.178 For some states, the costs of retaliation for defending 
the Baltics might be too great. Considering the serious political consequences that would 
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come from fully conceding to Russia’s behavior, member(s) might push for a smaller 
response, such as sanctions, in order to appear committed to the alliance. These methods 
may not be as effective in changing Russia’s behavior. Russia’s continued occupation in 
Crimea amidst ongoing Western sanctions displays the Kremlin’s willingness to adjust its 
economy to compensate. Faced with additional sanctions, it is unclear if Russia would 
adhere to international demands.   
 
The Non-Conventional Weaknesses of NATO 
Russia’s ability to utilize non-conventional means of warfare could pose future 
challenges for NATO. Any problems with the unanimous consensus of members will likely 
be exacerbated with the increasing presence of non-conventional warfare tactics that 
decreases transparency in security issues.  Some likely challenges will be managing cyber-
attacks, information warfare, and confronting adversaries who hide behind a wall of 
plausible deniability. 
  
Cyber Warfare 
        In 2007, NATO had its first experience dealing with a cyber-attack. During the spring, 
the Estonian government’s decision to move a 1947 Soviet Bronze Soldier war memorial 
out of the center of Tallinn inspired protests from the Russian speaking community.179 
Though the statue represented years of suffering under Soviet occupation for ethnic 
Estonians, for ethnic Russians, it represented victory over fascism in WWII.180 In August, 
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a massive cyber-attack hurt the country’s infrastructure. It blocked and took down online 
banking services, media outlets, and government websites and disseminated spam.181 
Although an anonymous Estonian official reported that evidence pointed to the Kremlin as 
the initiator, such as a Russian IP address identified as the source, there is no concrete 
evidence that could connect the attacks to the Russian government.182 Estonia considered 
asking the Allies to invoke Article 5, but hesitated, fearing a lack of support from 
members.183 At that time, the alliance had never confronted a cyber-adversary and a viable 
allied response was not clear.  
        Understanding the alliance’s weakness in cyber-defence and the ubiquitous 
vulnerability of all members, NATO has dedicated more attention and resources to 
developing a defensive strategy for cyber-attacks. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO 
released a new handbook that identified cyber-attacks as an increasing threat to the 
international community and encouraged developments to enhance cyber security.184 
Effects of this recommendation came to fruition in 2014 with the creation of the NATO 
Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), an institution aimed at strengthening cyber defence, 
and the signing of the Cyber Defence Pledge in 2016.185 Additionally, as of 2014, 
“cyberspace” was added as a protected security domain within the alliance’s objectives.186  
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These recent institutional and policy developments demonstrate NATO’s 
commitment to adapting to modern security challenges. Each of these developments aim 
to protect NATO members’ infrastructure from a state-led cyberattack. For instance, NICP 
seeks to “improve sharing of expertise [and] information, including information on threats 
and vulnerabilities [to] raise awareness and improve the understanding of cyber risks.”187 
However, future attacks may be state encouraged, but not state-led. For instance, studies 
on a 2008 cyberattack in Georgia by Deibert, Rohozinski, & Crete-Nishihata suggested the 
source of the attack could be either the Kremlin, a third party hired by the Kremlin, or 
Russian citizens who took government statements as a call to the public to implement a 
cyber-attack (Deibert, Rohozinski, & Crete-Nishihata 2012). Their study concluded that it 
was too difficult to determine the exact the source of the attacks because of problems with 
transparency.188 If cyber warfare starts to drift away from the state to second or third party 
initiators, NATO will face challenges in any retaliating, such as being able to identify the 
source.    
  
Information Warfare 
        Where the goal of cyber warfare is often to harm a nation’s infrastructure or computer 
networks, information warfare focuses on influencing the psychology of a nation.189 During 
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the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used disinformation campaigns 
to influence public opinion, which the Soviets characterized as dissemination of “false 
reports intended to mislead public opinion.”190 The Soviets were particularly skillful at this 
strategy. In 1983, a pro-Soviet newspaper published an article citing an anonymous but 
“well-known” source that claimed the United States had created AIDS to use in biological 
weapons.191 A newspaper in the Soviet Union ran the story in 1985 and by 1987, it is 
estimated that up to 50 countries had run the false story, showing how quickly 
disinformation can spread.192  
Today, disinformation, often called “fake news” still plays a prominent role in 
politics with the same goal of affecting public opinion. President Putin has strategically 
returned a majority of Russia’s media back to state control, either directly or indirectly, 
through establishing pro-Kremlin CEOs, in its effort to control public opinion.193 One 
strategy is to encourage the people to “question more” what they read in the media, offering 
the public an “alternative truth” from the Kremlin’s perspective that contradicts Western 
sources.194 For example, the Russian government controlled TASS News Agency reported 
on NATO’s recent deployment of reinforcements in the Baltics as an offensive action, to 
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which Russia would respond to defend its border.195 Conversely, Western sources 
described the deployment of additional troops as a defensive action in response to recent 
Russian aggression.196 Arguably, either source could be a victim of misperception, as both 
NATO and Russia have historically viewed the other as the aggressor. In the end, the 
contradictory information waves could confuse the average reader, opening the possibility 
of inaccurately perceiving critical political developments.  
If successfully implemented, disinformation campaigns could be particularly 
dangerous in a Russian-speaking region. This strategy could help create a “fifth column” 
opposition movement without the Russian government being directly involved. For 
example, in 2014, a Facebook page supporting the “Latgalian People’s Republic” suddenly 
appeared, providing a map of a potential breakaway region in Latvia.197 Latvia’s Security 
Police could not identify any direct evidence to identify the source of the page, but have 
suggested that an “outsider” in Russia likely created it.198 Though there have not been any 
active separatist movements, the creation of this site raises questions about how many 
people believed the story of the “Latgalian People’s Republic” or hoped it were true, 
especially in Latgale.  
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Some may believe disinformation campaigns are ineffective because the fake 
stories are either too outrageous to believe or are ultimately disproven. However, some 
analysts argue that creating a believable false story that is never debunked might not be 
Russia’s agenda. Unlike conventional warfare, which attacks the government and, in some 
cases, civilians, Russia uses the non-conventional disinformation tactic to attack the 
psychology of the population, causing doubt and suspicion of government institutions.199 
Over time, this doubt could spur anti-government resentment, political disengagement, and 
national or regional division, ultimately accomplishing the Kremlin’s goal of destabilizing 
the target government.200  
The North Atlantic Treaty and NATO’s recent advocacy to develop cyber defence 
strategies do not have a clear policy for countering such attacks. The onus falls on 
individual states to develop strategies to counter information campaigns that attempt to 
attack the government or ignite an opposition movement. With non-conventional strategies 
such as disinformation campaigns becoming more frequent and easier to spread with 
advanced technologies, NATO faces a challenge that is beyond the scope of the alliance. 
It was created to deter large Soviet forces and tanks from entering the Western world, not 
from campaigns that hope to break a nation from within. Therefore, though allies will likely 
support each other in each state’s quest for developing effective ways to deter these 
campaigns, there will likely not be adequate consensus on retaliation in response to a 
disinformation attack.   
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Limited Involvement and Plausible Deniability 
 In addition to using new tactics with technology, Russia has also developed its use 
of plausible deniability. This development could be viewed as an evolution from its use of 
international agreements to create legitimacy in previous interventions. For example, as 
discussed earlier Russia displayed open support for the South Ossetians and Abkahzians 
against their fight against the government in the Kremlin’s pursuit of creating instability in 
Georgia. This was easy to accomplish considering that Russia had peacekeepers stationed 
in both regions.201 Furthermore, Russia used the Sochi Agreement to justify its presence, 
even though international leaders argued that, after the beginning of the conflict, more 
troops entered the region than the treaty permitted.202  
 In Ukraine, Russian actions in Crimea were similar to those in Georgia. The 
Russian military was already present, many stationed at the Black Sea Fleet, making 
annexation easier than if Russia had to separately deploy troops.203 However, Russia’s 
alleged use of “little green men” to take over the Parliament building in Crimea and, then, 
its support for separatists in Ukraine’s eastern region demonstrate Putin’s boldness to take 
risks in conflicts and comfort with denying involvement or responsibility.204 Putin 
eventually admitted his plans to take Crimea prior to seizing the Parliament.205 Still, he has 
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avoided claiming the “little green men” as Russian soldiers, going only so far as to say 
these “self-defense forces [were]…backed by Russian servicemen.”206 To date, Russia 
continues to deny that any “regular Russian soldiers” are fighting in eastern Ukraine, 
regardless of reports from eyewitnesses, media sources, and the cargo shipments of coffins 
from Ukraine to Russia.207 Instead, Putin claims any Russian citizen fighting in Ukraine is 
a volunteer.208 Russia also continues to deny providing the separatist forces with any 
military equipment.209 However, a recent European General Court decision concluded that 
Russia has provided weaponry to the separatists.210 Though confronted with this, the 
Kremlin continues blatantly denying any involvement.  
Previously, Russia used international agreements and treaties to justify its 
involvement in interventions. Now, the Kremlin is finding ways to deny its involvement 
entirely, using unidentified troops, claiming Russians involved are only volunteers, and 
continuing to deny providing equipment. Russia’s willingness to implement clandestine 
operations in a border state should trouble NATO members. Similar to cyber and 
information warfare, it is difficult place to blame on Russia when the government 
repeatedly denies involvement and willingly clouds transparency. If Russia were to engage 
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in similar actions in Latvia or Estonia, it might be difficult to officially tie Russia to the 
events. The Kremlin could use “little green men” or call a small brigade of forces 
“volunteers” to implement a small attack on a government building in Latvia or Estonia’s 
Russian speaking regions.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The analysis above suggests that NATO and Russia will continue to have a 
contentious relationship, but that the aspects of that relationship is changing. Possible gains 
for Russia in a conventional attack on Latvia or Estonia are likely offset by the risk of 
NATO Allies invoking Article 5. However, engaging through asymmetric tactics could 
bring political gains, create an opportunity to deny involvement, and decrease the risk of 
retaliation. If evidence suggested, but could not confirm, Russia had inspired and provided 
support to an opposition movement in Latvia or Estonia, the Allies would be forced to 
make a difficult decision: respond to a non-conventional nuclear power, risking massive 
retaliation, or accept any territorial losses or frozen conflicts. 
 Possible weaknesses of NATO, some of which have developed recently, increases 
the likelihood of the Allies facing that difficult decision. NATO’s lack of available military 
equipment and the geography of Estonia and Latvia would complicate any attack that 
needed a rapid response to prevent a massive loss. NATO has tried curb this problem by 
deploying more troops to the Baltic region.211 These troops would likely be useful in 
delaying any advancements of an attack, especially if the forces were merely a small 
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brigade of “little green men”. However, because this is a recent development, more time is 
needed to determine the effectiveness of this addition.  
 Other weaknesses might not be as easy to remedy by adding equipment or 
personnel. As war continues to utilize asymmetric and less conventional tactics, all NATO 
members may have a harder time making a consensus decision. In cases such as cyber-
attacks, disinformation campaigns, or plausible deniability, some NATO members may 
hesitate in deciding to respond or what method of a response would be necessary.  
 NATO has undoubtedly been an effective institution in bringing countries together 
that believe in the principles of the alliance and establishing a commitment to Euro-Atlantic 
security. These principles have changed from deterring Soviet expansion and influence to 
broader security objectives, such as the fight against terrorism and the spread of democracy. 
However, the international field continues changing and the question remains if NATO 
could, or should, adapt to meet these changes. In some ways, the alliance has decided to 
modernize by recently creating a cyber-defence institution to develop strategies to deter 
future cyber-attacks. Though useful in many ways, policy goals tend to focus specifically 
on defending a state’s infrastructure from a debilitating state-led cyber-attack. This 
captures only one area of cyber risks. Others include possible disinformation campaigns 
that may encourage an opposition movement or an offensive attack on a local government 
in a Russian-speaking region with unidentifiable, yet very well equipped soldiers. Recent 
developments in NATO indicate that the alliance is aware of its shortcomings. However, 
more policies should be developed that provides clarity on terminology and plausible 
effective responses to an asymmetric offensive attack or determine modern boundaries 
within its collective defence framework.    
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS  
 
 Based on the analysis above, the high risk of a NATO armed response will likely 
deter a Russian conventional intervention in Estonia or Latvia. However, the Georgia and 
Ukraine conflicts highlight Russia’s evolving capability using non-conventional tactics to 
confront asymmetrical actors. The possibility of Russia intervening in a NATO member 
state should not be quickly cast aside. With the changing nature of warfare, security 
analysts would be wise to reassess the security of the Baltic regions. As the Georgian and 
Ukrainian conflicts demonstrate, Russia brazenly uses international agreements to justify 
aggressive actions that the international community repeatedly calls a violation of 
international law and norms. Yet international opposition appears ineffective in influencing 
Russia’s decision to intervene. If the Kremlin were susceptible to international soft 
diplomacy like sanctions, Russia would have ceased its operations in Crimea after the 
implementation of sanctions. On the contrary, high domestic public opinions after Crimea 
could imply that the populace supports the Kremlin’s actions abroad if there is a 
geographic, cultural, or historic connection. If the “window of opportunity” and desire 
exists, the Kremlin might try to interfere in the Baltics.  
 The Kremlin’s “window of opportunity” contains a key element: a bordering 
country with Russian compatriots that are allegedly discriminated against where the 
Kremlin can use international agreements to justify an intervention on humanitarian 
principles. These factors are seen in Estonia and Latvia, where the Russian speaking areas 
Ida-Viru and Latgale experience higher rates of unemployment and poverty than the 
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majority population. It is possible that domestic legislation contributes to this disparity, 
which allow for indirect discrimination against individuals who do not have advanced 
levels of the state language. Legislation on pensions could also play a role, as ethnic 
Russians eligible for pensions in Estonia or Latvia could receive a lower pension if they 
worked in a different republic during the Soviet Union. Finally, Russian speakers 
struggling to pass the language proficiency exam to receive citizenship are stuck with the 
status of “stateless person,” limiting their voting rights and political representation, which 
could, consequently, increase their sense of social marginalization and decrease their sense 
of belonging to their state of residence.  If the Kremlin had the political desire for 
intervening in Estonia or Latvia, the necessary “window of opportunity” to establish its 
Russian-perceived grounds for action exists.  
According to the RAND Corporation, Russia has the conventional capability to 
invade and occupy Estonia and Latvia. Recent decisions from NATO show the alliance’s 
awareness of the Russian threat of aggression. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, allies agreed 
to increase NATO presence in the east, creating four rotational battalion-size battlegroups, 
one in each Baltic state and the fourth in Poland.212 Canada, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States each agreed to lead one of the groups.213 This multinational 
effort reasserts the alliances commitment to deterrence and defence in the Baltics. 
As the alliance appears to be striving to reinforce its commitments, the United 
States’ commitment to the alliance might be wavering. Although Secretary of Defense 
                                                
212 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (8). “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and 
Southeast”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). March 15, 2017. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.  
 
213 Ibid. 
  
63 
James Mattis has publically stated that the United States is undoubtedly committed to 
NATO, U.S. President Donald Trump’s consistent and caustic criticism of the 23 members 
not meeting their financial commitments raises questions about Trump’s view of the 
alliance.214 White House officials described Trump’s speech in May where he vowed to 
“never forsake the friends that stood by our side” after Sept. 11 in May as an “affirmation 
on mutual defence.”215 European leaders, on the other hand, view Trump’s words with 
ambiguity.216 Whether next month President Trump will view NATO as “obsolete” or “no 
longer obsolete” remains a mystery, which could have catastrophic effects for Baltic 
security. Due to these developments, it is uncertain if the United States would agree to 
invoke Article 5 in response to a security issue in Estonia or Latvia.   
Even if NATO’s mutual defense clause would deter the Russian government from 
pursuing a conventional intervention, the question remains on how NATO would deter or 
defend against a non-conventional strategy. Transparency issues from non-conventional 
attacks could delay or deteriorate the Allies commitment to mutual defence. Going 
forward, NATO must develop a stronger definition as to what constitutes an “armed attack” 
and how the Allies should identify, deter, and respond to new warfare strategies such as 
cyber and information attacks. Finally, Russia’s ability to create “plausible deniability” and 
covertly support opposition forces should concern Allies. Though small, NATO’s 
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increased presence in the Baltics might provide the necessary support to stop any 
opposition forces that are at risk of creating a situation in Estonia or Latvia that is similar 
to Ukraine. In the future, it seems vital for Allies to continue strengthening each members’ 
domestic forces to counter and quickly respond to domestic threats. Although mutual 
defence and the threat of Article 5 might have been the alliance’s strongest characteristic 
at the beginning, perhaps mutual deterrence alongside individual efforts will play a bigger 
role in preserving international security in the North Atlantic.   
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